How Do Race and Gender Affect Whose Voices Are Heard and Believed?

It’s worth questioning, are we always judged by what we know, or does who we are influence whether others believe us? Imagine attending a meeting where you wish to present an idea that you came up with, only to be dismissed, overlooked or questioned after proudly contributing. Then moments later, someone else makes the same point and receives recognition for it.

Through the concept of epistemic justice, developed by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, in a situation an individual can be unfairly disadvantaged in their capacity as a knower. The concept ‘testimonial injustice’ occurs when prejudice leads someone to receive less credibility than they deserve. So, in professional environments, where authority often determines whose ideas are considered, credibility is especially important.

Yet, credibility alone is not usually judged from a person’s identity. Some assumptions about someone’s race, gender and culture can influence how their words are interpreted. An example would be a confident woman being perceived as aggressive, while a confident man would be seen as assertive. Or a colleague from a racialised background might find that people question their abilities or feel like they constantly must prove themselves. These examples show how social expectations can shape how people’s ideas are understood and valued.

Another question may be raised: what happens when race and gender overlap? The concept of intersectionality helps to explain why these experiences cannot always be understood alone. Like the way a woman is judged at work may be influenced by gender but also by her race and the stereotypes attached to it. These factors can exist together to shape how others see her, how seriously they take her and whether they recognise her abilities.

This matters because having sufficient knowledge is essential when being in a professional environment, but being recognised as someone who is entitled to contribute is also important. A person may have the right qualifications, experience and insight but still struggle to have their contributions taken seriously. Therefore, the problem is not a lack of knowledge or ability, but the social conditions under which knowledge is recognised.

Consistent experiences of being dismissed can also affect how people participate. Someone who anticipates being interrupted, misunderstood or judged may start to overprepare, adjust their tone or hesitate before speaking. Instead of these responses being mistaken for a lack of confidence or competence, they might try to adapt to a workplace where speaking up feels riskier for some people than others.

Furthermore, institutions can set expectations about who belongs, what professionalism looks like and whose voices are treated as authoritative. This means that epistemic injustice may not result from one person’s prejudice; it can also come from institutional norms that repeatedly prioritise some voices over others.

Finally, the question of who gets heard is also a question about whose knowledge counts. If professional environments are to recognise people fairly, it is not enough to encourage individuals to speak up; it is necessary to look at the assumptions through which their contributions are received and valued. Epistemic justice involves more than allowing everyone to speak, it requires taking seriously the social conditions that determine who is believed.

References: 

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989, no. 1 (1989): 139–67.

Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

• gender
• intersectionality
• race