The international community has tried to limit the sourcing of blood minerals; however, lawmakers have not guaranteed that unethical sourcing does not pollute any portion of the supply chain.
Passed in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act has a crucial Section (1502) that specifically sought to increase transparency in companies’ supply chains to prevent them from allowing a portion of their revenue to fuel armed conflict. Along with Section 1502, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has created due diligence guidelines to ensure each part of a company’s supply chain qualifies as conflict free.
Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank and other similar non-US measures have devastated local mining communities. Mining these minerals is their financial lifeline.
In order to adequately analyze the application of these guidelines, I need to divide my analysis into large scale mining (LSM) and artisanal scale mining (ASM). For large scale mining operations, the due diligence guidelines primarily focus on companies needing to regularly check-in with each element of their supply chain, acknowledging that even outside the mines themselves, abuses can occur.
This division also acknowledges the essential status of ASM for the local communities, and OECD recommends that companies create concessions for informal miners. In terms of the informal miners themselves, OECD has put forth guidelines for how these miners can possibly unionize to protect their worker’s rights.
Unlike the formal mining sector, few regulation measures exist to protect ASM locations. When news outlets report on stories about human rights abuses of Congolese miners, they usually are writing about people working in the ASM sector. These miners specifically are more vulnerable to black market smugglers exploiting them because of the legal grey area of their work.
High-profile names like Apple, Intel, and Microsoft made this decision to make their compliance with Section 1502 easier than attempting to navigate the maze of local bureaucracy in the DRC . In this case, the people who worked the hardest also received the worst punishment.
While multinational corporations can continue to create profits with different mining sources, they leave behind millions of workers who have few other options to generate income. Additionally, they create a higher probability for workers to turn to the informal market to independently sell the minerals.
Without the security forces of a multinational corporation, artisanal miners also become more vulnerable to exploitation through the informal tax market which many local militias impose. When local militias cannot directly control the mines, they turn to the culturally accepted norm of bribery and kleptocracy to create revenue.
Solving these interlocking sets of issues requires not only a will from within the country to change, but also a willingness from the corporations outside the country to change their business practices. The unilateral application of non-Congolese legislation to regulate conflict minerals has not changed on governance, has not worked well in the past and certainly cannot create positive change now.
I contend the primary goal and first step should be outside investment in improving local infrastructure. Poor infrastructure across the eastern regions of the DRC such as North Kivu makes it incredibly difficult for miners to access resources such as education and a consistent food supply.
The locations of the mines are so cut off from everyday society, making it incredibly difficult for people to have freedom to move between the mining towns and the nearest major city. Ironically, the capital and products derived from the miner’s labor has more freedom of movement than the miners themselves. Caught in the crossfires of ongoing conflict are the miners themselves who deserve the ability to live their lives peacefully.