The UK Supreme Court’s decision, announced on 23 November, to oppose a consultative referendum on Scottish independence probably came as no surprise to the Scottish public. Whether you are a supporter of a solid United Kingdom or understand Scottish aspirations, it is essential to take a critical look at the situation, and the democratic and geopolitical issues it raises.
First, a bit of background. Since the beginning of her mandates (2014-2016, 2016-2021, 2021-), Scottish First Leader Nicola Sturgeon has requested several times to hold a second referendum on Scottish independence, but her pleas have always been refused successively by Theresa May and Boris Johnson (the latter even arguing that a ‘referendum should be held only once in a generation‘). This is a position also shared by Rishi Sunak, who declared during a meeting in Perth in September 2022 (during the Leadership Elections campaign) that he found it absurd for some Scottish politicians to focus their energy on independence issues while people are wondering how they will manage to heat their houses.
Moreover, the holding of a referendum on independence is decided at the UK government level, as opposed to Scottish Parliament, by a decision of the House of Commons, which explains the blockage of any such vote. This constitutional situation puts the independentists and Sturgeon in a difficult situation, a legislative deadlock. In June 2022, Sturgeon announced her intention to hold a second referendum on 19 October 2023 and asked the Supreme Court to rule on the legality (or not) of holding a consultative referendum without the agreement of the British Parliament. Sturgeon’s address to the Supreme Court also called on the Court not to consider the political consequences of such a vote but to examine only the legality or otherwise of the vote. She also stated that it would not be necessary to take such actions, if Scottish democracy was respected by Westminster.
A consultative referendum, then, that did not in any way commit Scotland to independence. But a referendum, still consultative, declared prohibited by the Court. Besides demonstrations in Edinburgh, Sturgeon told a press conference that she was “disappointed” and that the Supreme Court’s decision was a clear indication that the United Kingdom was no longer a “voluntary union”.
A growing desire for independence, echoing the democratic need for representation
Poignant words that sound like a cry of strangulation. The reasons for Scottish independence are well known: 62% of Scots voted in 2016 against Brexit. Moreover, after the results of the vote, Sturgeon kept putting forward proposals to maintain the UK close to the European common market – proposals that were never listened to, with the UK government going it alone at every stage of the Brexit negotiations. Considered as a betrayal, Brexit dealt a blow to Scottish pro-independence seeds, first turned over in the 2014 referendum (keeping Scotland within the UK precisely because Edinburgh wanted to remain in the EU). This dissent was compounded by a mishandling of the health crisis, rising energy prices but, above all, the perpetual maintenance of a conservative government at the UK level.
Thus, if most Scots want independence above all, it is for a political reason: Scots vote differently from English people. Since 1959, they have never given a majority to the Conservative Party. The democratic argument then comes into play: why remain in a union that only asks Scotland to submit politically? The SNP’s aim, by default, is to press for more flexibility year on year – as allowed by the Devolution system, initiated by the establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 1998. Nevertheless, Scottish autonomy remains extremely limited, if not non-existent, in certain areas (e.g. taxation, foreign affairs).
A political renewal that could change everything?
However, while any Scottish independence referendum is unlikely, the UK political situation could provide a new lease of life, with the next general election due to be held in 2024. The Labour Party, which shares much in common with the SNP (whose 2021 election strengthened its majority), would be more likely to engage in a series of compromises with Scottish nationals.
The convergence of British and Scottish views, and thus better political representation, could actually absorb many problems. Indeed, although Sturgeon communicated, after the Supreme Court announcement, that the next SNP general election campaign will be focused on pro-independence issues, such a decision will probably not solve the situation. Beyond the glamour of Scottish independence, the political reality in Scotland is more equivocal: the SNP is not the only major political party, nor do all its members espouse pro-independence aspirations – as a reminder, the SNP’s accession in 2007 was largely due to a massive rejection of the Labour Party. Moreover, the SNP has not put forward any convincing proposals in the event of an exit from the UK: retaining the pound, for example, would mean remaining the puppet of the British central bank.
And, above all, securing a return to the European Union would not be an easy task: not only in terms of the border, but especially in consideration of the tensions it might create between England and the EU – whose diplomatic and commercial rapprochement, and thus good diplomatic relations, could only be encouraged. Scotland would need to be assured that the EU would welcome it back, but is it possible to negotiate a return while still a member of the UK?